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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici Curiae are academic specialists on universal jurisdiction and denial of justice under the law of
nations. They have an important interest in this case,
which raises the question of whether and under what
circumstances the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350, allows courts to recognize causes of action for
violations of the law of nations in foreign territory.
Universal jurisdiction and denial of justice are
longstanding law-of-nations principles that bear
heavily on the resolution of this question. Amici
respectfully submit this Brief in support of neither
party to clarify the law and history relating to these
principles in the law of nations and U.S. law. Amici
are:
Anthony A. D’Amato, Leighton Professor of Law,
Northwestern University, author of numerous books,
including THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1971), THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT: AN ANALYTICAL ANTHOLOGY (with Ralph G. Steinhardt) (1999),
and over 100 articles, including The Alien Tort Statute and the Founding of the Constitution, 82 AM. J.
INT’L L. 62 (1988). He is a member of the Supreme
Court Bar.
1

This Brief has been filed with the written consent of the
parties, which is on file with the Clerk of Court. Pursuant to
Rule 37.6, Amici Curiae state that no counsel for a party authored this Brief in whole or in part, nor did any person or
entity, other than Amici Curiae, make a monetary contribution
to the preparation or submission of this Brief.

2
Anthony J. Colangelo, Assistant Professor of Law,
Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of
Law, author of numerous articles on universal jurisdiction and U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction, including A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA.
L. REV. 1019 (2011); Universal Jurisdiction as an
International “False Conflict” of Laws, 30 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 881 (2009); Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of
National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT’L L. J.
121 (2007), cited in United States v. Hamdan, Ruling
on Motion to Dismiss (Ex Post Facto) 5-6 (July 14,
2008); United States v. Emmanuel (a.k.a. Chuckie
Taylor), No. 06-20758-CR, 2007 WL 2002452 (S.D.
Fla. July 5, 2007); Goldberg v. UBS, Ltd., 690
F. Supp. 2d 92 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); United States v.
Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2010); and The
Legal Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 47 VA. J. INT’L
L. 149 (2006), cited in In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig.,
617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); United States v.
Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2010).
---------------------------------i---------------------------------

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The question presented is “whether and under
what circumstances the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350, allows courts to recognize a cause of action
for violations of the law of nations occurring within
the territory of a sovereign other than the United

3
States.”2 In this Amicus Brief we argue from a historical perspective going back to the Middle Ages that
when the law of nations is in issue, not only is there
no presumption against extraterritoriality, but jurisdiction over causes of action arising abroad is in
many cases required. More specifically, we argue that
Congress affirmatively conferred universal jurisdiction in the Alien Tort Statute [“ATS”] under the law of
nations, and that to refuse such jurisdiction in cases
of denial of justice would be contrary to longstanding
principles of the law of nations. In short, limiting the
ATS to claims arising in U.S. territory would contravene both the statute’s clear indication of universal
jurisdiction and the Charming Betsy canon of construction that statutes should not be construed to
violate the law of nations.3
---------------------------------i---------------------------------

ARGUMENT
I.

The ATS Affirmatively Confers Universal
Jurisdiction

No presumption against extraterritoriality
applies to the ATS. The statute clearly indicates
universal jurisdiction by expressly incorporating the
law of nations, which contains both substantive and
2

Order in Pending Case, Kiobel, Esther, et al. v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum, et al., No. 10-1491 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2012).
3
Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy (The Charming
Betsy), 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).

4
jurisdictional components.4 A much-cited case from
1818 generally regarded as the Supreme Court’s first
invention of a presumption against extraterritoriality,
United States v. Palmer, applied a limiting presumption to block U.S. jurisdiction over the universal
offense of piracy on a foreign-flag vessel because the
vessel was considered the legal equivalent of foreign
sovereign territory. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 632-33
(1818). Congress immediately rejected that construction and enacted a new statute the very next year
granting universal jurisdiction. Crucially, Congress
rewrote the statute to affirmatively confer universal
jurisdiction by expressly granting jurisdiction over
“piracy, as defined by the law of nations.” Act of Mar.
3, 1819, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513-14. By invoking
“the law of nations,” Congress purposefully authorized the application of both an international substantive rule and an international jurisdictional principle
so as to confer upon U.S. courts universal jurisdiction
to apply that rule. The ATS similarly expressly confers jurisdiction over torts “in violation of the law of
nations,” 28 U.S.C. § 1350, and similarly should be
understood to authorize application of international
substantive and jurisdictional components of that
law.

4

Every rule of international law down through the 19th
Century was a combination of substantive and jurisdictional
components for the simple reason that there were hardly any
international courts; only national courts were consistently
available to apply international law.

5
In brief, Congress knew how to bestow universal
jurisdiction over law-of-nations violations in what
was clearly considered foreign territory, and did so by
explicitly incorporating into statutes “the law of
nations,” which includes both substantive and jurisdictional components. It would be inappropriate for
this Court to read that “affirmative indication” of
jurisdiction out of the ATS today. Morrison v. Nat’l
Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010). Indeed, it
would be especially inappropriate since Congress
could not have known of any judicially created presumption at the time it enacted the ATS and used
precisely the “law of nations” language to repudiate a
presumption against extraterritoriality as applied to
the early piracy statute.
A. Universal Jurisdiction Authorizes All
States to Apply the Law of Nations
To understand how the ATS confers universal
jurisdiction under the law of nations it is first necessary to understand universal jurisdiction. The international legal principle existed at the time Congress
enacted the ATS, it exists under the “present-day law
of nations,” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692,
725 (2004), and it was recognized by this Court’s
decision in Sosa, see id. at 732. Universal jurisdiction
grants every state in the world jurisdiction to apply
international law to certain violations of the law of
nations, even if the state had no connection to the
violation when and where it occurred. This is indeed
one of the principle’s defining characteristics: When

6
states exercise universal jurisdiction, they do not
apply solely national law to activity beyond their
borders but an international law that already applied
to the activity when and where it occurred.
This Court made the point clearly in United
States v. Smith with regard to the original universal
jurisdiction offense of piracy:
[t]he common law . . . recognises and punishes
piracy as an offence, not against its own municipal code, but as an offence against the
law of nations, (which is part of the common
law,) as an offence against the universal law
of society, a pirate being deemed an enemy of
the human race.
18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161-62 (1820). The substantive prohibition on universal violations of the law of
nations is tied intimately with a jurisdictional principle that all states may enforce that prohibition:
And the general practice of all nations in
punishing all persons, whether natives or
foreigners, who have committed this offence
against any persons whatsoever, with whom
they are in amity, is a conclusive proof that
the offence is supposed to depend, not upon
the particular provisions of any municipal
code, but upon the law of nations, both for its
definition and punishment.
Id. at 162. See also United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S.
(5 Wheat.) 184, 197 (1820) (explaining that piracy
is subject to “universal jurisdiction” and that it
“is considered as an offence within the criminal

7
jurisdiction of all nations[ ] It is against all, and
punished by all”). Similarly, Blackstone declared
piracy “an offence against the universal law of society; a pirate being . . . hostis humani generis.” 5 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
71 (1769); see also id. (“[B]y declaring war against all
mankind, all mankind must declare war against
him.”). As these authorities make clear, universal
jurisdiction grants all states jurisdiction to enforce
international law. When a state exercises universal
jurisdiction, it does not extend national law extraterritorially to foreign conduct but rather acts as a
decentralized enforcer of the law of nations that
already applied to the conduct when and where it
occurred.
Universal jurisdiction works the same way today5
and gives rise to ATS liability under Sosa’s methodology.
5

Today treaties, while not themselves the customary law of
nations (since they are positive agreements among states),
provide strong evidence of what customary international law
deems universal jurisdiction violations by demonstrating “the
customs and usages of civilized nations,” The Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), resulting from widespread state
practice ratifying and implementing the treaties in domestic
law. For example, treaties like the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465
U.N.T.S. 85, arts. 5.2, 7.1, and the Montreal Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 177, arts. 5, 7,
authorize and, in many situations, require the exercise of
jurisdiction by states parties with personal jurisdiction over
offenders – even if the state had no connection to the offense
when it occurred. Any doubt about the customary lawmaking
(Continued on following page)

8
For example, Sosa cited United States v. Smith – the
criminal piracy case quoted at length above – to
demonstrate the “historical paradigms” that inform
ATS inquiries under “the present-day law of nations.” 542 U.S. at 732. As discussed, Smith’s definition of piracy under the law of nations included
both a substantive and a jurisdictional component:

character of the treaties is resolved by the fact that they do not
condition the exercise of universal jurisdiction by states parties
with custody of the accused on the commission of the offense
within the territory of another state party to the treaty. By
effectively extending the prohibition in the treaty to any state in
the world where the offense occurs, these treaties are quintessential “law-making” treaties, or treaties of customary “normcreating character.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621
F.3d 111, 138-39 (2d Cir. 2010); see also North Sea Continental
Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 41 (Feb. 20);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(3) (1987). In other words, the treaties clearly
reflect “the customs and usages of civilized nations,” The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700, with respect to both what
conduct is substantively prohibited under the law of nations and
when states have jurisdiction over that conduct. In this regard,
the treaties help cure the Court’s early lament in Smith that
“[o]ffences . . . against the law of nations, cannot, with any
accuracy, be said to be completely ascertained and defined in any
public code recognised by the common consent of nations.” 18
U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 159 (relying on writings of twenty five
publicists or scholars to ascertain the settled definition and
scope of piracy under the law of nations). Today such a code
largely exists in the form of widely ratified multilateral treaties.
And they unambiguously provide jurisdiction where a state
gains personal jurisdiction over the perpetrator of certain
universal violations of the present-day law of nations – even if
that state had no connection to the violation when it occurred.

9
substantively, piracy comprised robbery on the high
seas; jurisdictionally, “all nations . . . punish[ ] all
persons, whether natives or foreigners, who have
committed this offence against any persons whatsoever.” 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 161-62. Immediately after
citing Smith, Sosa cited the Second Circuit’s famous
statement in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala that, “for purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become – like the
pirate and slave trader before him – hostis humani
generis – an enemy of all mankind.” 542 U.S. at 732.
Factually, Filártiga involved a foreign plaintiff,
foreign defendant, and foreign conduct. Legally, as
with Smith’s recitation of universal jurisdiction over
an “enemy of the human race,” Filártiga’s invocation
of an “enemy of all mankind” encompasses both a
substantive prohibition and a jurisdictional principle
that all states can enforce that international legal
prohibition. 542 U.S. at 732. As the next section
explains, Sosa got it exactly right: The ATS affirmatively confers universal jurisdiction to apply the law
of nations and no presumption against extraterritoriality limits the application of that law.
B. The ATS Embodies Universal Jurisdiction
This Court recently reaffirmed that a presumption against extraterritoriality applies to U.S. statutes. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (“When a statute
gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”). The presumption is not a limitation on sovereignty but a canon of construction
designed to effectuate legislative intent. Id. As this

10
Court explained early on in United States v. Palmer,
even where Congress has power to legislate, general
statutory “words must be limited in some degree, and
the intent of the legislature will determine the extent
of this limitation. For this intent we must examine
the law.” 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 631-32 (1818). When
“examin[ing] the law,” id., “[a]ssuredly context can be
consulted as well.” Morrision, 130 S. Ct. at 2883. The
language and context of the ATS clearly demonstrate
that to the extent courts use the law of nations as the
rule of decision under the statute, the statute confers
universal jurisdiction under that law.
Palmer used a species of presumption against
extraterritoriality to restrictively construe the reach
of a 1790 statute prohibiting piracy, defined as
“robbery . . . upon the high seas” by “any person or
persons.” 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 626 (1818). The
Court held that the statute did not reach such acts
committed by foreigners against foreigners on a
foreign-flag ship. Id. at 631. Here it should be
stressed – especially given this Court’s framing of
the issue in the present case for re-argument – that
piracy on another nation’s ship constituted a “violation[ ] of the law of nations occurring within the
territory of a sovereign other than the United States,”
Order in Pending Case, Kiobel, Esther, et al. v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum, et al., No. 10-1491 (U.S. Mar. 5,
2012), since traditionally “[a] vessel at sea is considered as a part of the territory to which it belongs
when at home. It carries with it the local legal rights

11
and legal jurisdiction of such locality.” Wilson v.
McNamee, 102 U.S. 572, 574 (1880).6
To be sure, it was precisely this jurisdictional
feature and the attendant fear of foreign sovereign
interference that caused the Court in Palmer to
restrict the 1790 piracy statute’s scope. The Court
first observed that the title of the entire act – “ ‘an act
for the punishment of certain crimes against the
United States’ ” – suggested that Congress’s concern
was with “offences against the United States, not
offences against the human race.” Palmer, 16 U.S. (3
Wheat.) at 631. The Court then turned to its principal
concern that reading all of the piracy statute’s general terms globally would interfere with other nations’ sovereignty by projecting U.S. law onto the
legal equivalent of foreign sovereign territory –
namely, foreign-flag ships.
For the 1790 act prohibited not just “robbery . . .
upon the high seas” – which constituted piracy under
the law of nations, Smith, 18 U.S. (Wheat.) at 161-62
– but also purely municipal offenses like “run[ing]
away” with a ship or merchandise or “lay[ing] violent
hands upon [a] commander.” Palmer, 16 U.S.
(Wheat.) at 626-27. These latter offenses did not
constitute piracy under the law of nations but were

6

See also St. Clair v. United States, 154 U.S. 134, 152
(1894); United States v. Smiley, 27 F. Cas. 1132, 1134 (C.C.N.D.
Cal. 1864) (No. 16,317).
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instead referred to as “piracy . . . by statute.”
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES at 72; see also Anthony J.
Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality,
97 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1061-75 (2011) (addressing the
difference between piracy under the law of nations
and piracy by statute). These piracies by statute were
solely creatures of municipal or domestic law, not
international law. As a result, they were subject only
to territorial (or flag) and national jurisdiction, not
universal jurisdiction. Id.
The Palmer Court worried that Congress could
not have intended all of these other general terms
prohibiting piracy by statute under municipal law to
apply globally to activities on foreign-flag ships. The
reason was that such extraterritorial application of
U.S. law into a foreign jurisdiction could interfere
with foreign sovereignty:
But it cannot be supposed that the legislature intended to punish a seaman on board a
ship sailing under a foreign flag, under the
jurisdiction of a foreign government, who
should lay violent hands up, on his commander, or make a revolt in the ship. These
are offences against the nation under whose
flag the vessel sails, and within whose particular jurisdiction all on board the vessel
are. Every nation provides for such offences
the punishment its own policy may dictate;
and no general words of a statute ought to be
construed to embrace them when committed
by foreigners against a foreign government.

13
Palmer, 16 U.S. (Wheat.) at 632-33.7 The Court then
reasoned backward from this supposition about the
piracies by statute listed in the latter part of the 1790
act to the particular piracy in the case before it –
robbery on the seas by “any person” – and gave that
piracy the same, limited construction. Id. at 633
(“That the general words of the two latter members of
this sentence [piracies by statute] are to be restricted
to offences committed on board the vessels of the
United States, furnishes strong reason for believing
that the legislature intended to impose the same
restriction on the general words used in the first
member of the sentence [robbery on the high seas or
piracy under the law of nations].”).
Yet according to Congress – which presumably
knew its own intent – the Court got it wrong. Palmer
was “roundly criticized by contemporaries” for limiting the scope of the 1790 statute and stunting the
7

That Palmer had to do with the fact that the offense
occurred on foreign territory is confirmed by the Court’s decision
just two years later in United States v. Klintock, which dealt
with the same section of the same 1790 statute as Palmer, but
the piracy had occurred on a stateless, instead of a foreign-flag,
ship. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144 (1820). The Court distinguished
Klintock on this basis and applied the statute on the ground that
Palmer only governed ships “sailing under the flag of a foreign
State, whose authority is acknowledged. This is the case which
was presented to the Court [in Palmer]; and this is the case
which was decided.” Id. at 151; see also id. at 152 (observing that
general statutory terms “ought not to be so construed as to
extend to persons under the acknowledged authority of a foreign
State”). These cases make crystal clear that ships were deemed
part of the territory of the state under whose flag they sailed.

14
United States’s ability to prosecute piracy under the
law of nations.8 In one famous criticism, John Quincy
Adams renounced Palmer as “a sample of judicial
logic – disingenuous, false, and hollow” and an
“enormous hole in the moral garment of this nation
made by this desperate thrust of the Supreme Court.”
J. Q. Adams, diary entry for May 11, 1819, in 4 THE
MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 363 (C. Adams ed.,
1874-77).
In direct response to Palmer, Congress passed a
new piracy statute the very next year to mend the
hole Palmer had hewn and affirmatively create
universal jurisdiction over piracy against the law of
nations.9 The statute, accordingly, conferred jurisdiction over “any person or persons whatsoever” who
“shall, on the high seas, commit the crime of piracy,
as defined by the law of nations.” Act of Mar. 3, 1819,
ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513-14 (emphasis added).
In short, to overrule Palmer and affirmatively
indicate universal jurisdiction, Congress expressly
8

G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and International
Law: The Piracy Cases, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 727, 731 (1989).
9
See United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 612 (E.D.
Va. 2010) (“In response to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the Act of 1790 in Palmer, Congress passed the Act of 1819 to
make clear that it wished to proscribe not only piratical acts
that had a nexus to the United States, but also piracy as an
international offense subject to universal jurisdiction.”); ALFRED
P. RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY 158 (2d ed. 1998) (“The immediate
result of U.S. v. Palmer in the halls of the Congress was the
passage of [the Act of 1819]. . . .”).

15
invoked the definition of piracy under “the law of
nations.” Id. The ATS contains a similar invocation. It
too confers jurisdiction over “all causes where an
alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of
nations. . . .” Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20 § 9, 1 Stat.
77. It would be passing strange for this Court to find
that precisely the type of language Congress used to
confer universal jurisdiction – and to overrule the
Court’s limiting presumption once before – does not
now confer universal jurisdiction to apply the law of
nations.
Indeed, when courts use the law of nations as the
rule of decision none of the presumption’s motivating
rationales apply. To the contrary, the rationales may
even argue in favor of the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction
to fulfill U.S. obligations under international law in
some cases – for example, in cases where the United
States has a responsibility to punish universal offenses like piracy. The presumption aims “to protect
against unintended clashes between our laws and
those of other nations which could result in international discord,” EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991), and to heed the
presumption that when Congress legislates, it “is
primarily concerned with domestic conditions.” Id.
Although the ATS is a primarily jurisdictional statute, Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712, the presumption could in
principle apply if courts were to use purely domestic
U.S. common law principles as rules of decision. In
that situation, it would be courts, not Congress,
crafting “our laws.” Yet those laws could still
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“clash[ ] ” with foreign laws inside foreign territory.
Aramco, 449 U.S. at 248.
But when U.S. courts apply the law of nations,
the potential for true conflicts of laws largely disappears. Unlike, for example, the Securities Exchange
Act at issue in Morrison, or the Sherman Antitrust
Act at issue in F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v.
Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) – both of which
involved projecting purely U.S. domestic laws into
foreign territory – the same law of nations applies at
home and abroad. Concerns about extraterritorial
applications of U.S. law conflicting with foreign law
inside foreign territory thus largely vanish since U.S.
law authorizes application of an international law
already operative inside the foreign territory.10 And
10

The argument that the ATS should not reach foreign
harms because it is unique in authorizing civil liability under
international law fails for at least three reasons. As an initial
matter, civil liability is explicitly built into the statute. Presumptions are only that: presumptions. They do not apply where
statutes are clear, and the ATS is clear on civil liability. Second,
as noted above, using international criminal law to discern the
norm of international law actionable under the ATS is consistent
with Sosa’s methodology, see supra Part I. Indeed, requiring a
freestanding norm of civil liability in international law would
effectively render the ATS a dead letter, contrary to Sosa’s
methodology and clear finding that the ATS is not a mere
“jurisdictional convenience to be placed on the shelf for use by a
future Congress . . . to make some element of the law of nations
actionable for the benefit of foreigners.” 542 U.S. 692, 719
(2004). Finally, as Part III explains below, international law
allows jurisdiction in civil suits between foreigners arising out of
foreign conduct or transactions.
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while the presumption that Congress legislates with
only domestic concerns in mind may make sense for
statutes reflecting national values and preferences
like the securities or antitrust laws, that presumption
holds far less intuitive force when Congress authorizes application of the law of nations, which, after
all, deals by definition with foreign nations and
shared values and preferences with those nations.
Morrison explained that courts could consider “context” in determining the geographic scope of statutes.
130 S. Ct. at 2883. Here the context is that the statute authorizes application of international, not domestic, law. In that connection, the relevant canon of
construction should be Charming Betsy, under which
courts construe ambiguous statutes in conformity
with international law, see Murray v. The Schooner
Charming Betsy (The Charming Betsy), 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64, 118 (1804), and which would allow and
sometimes even encourage U.S. jurisdiction, even
where there is no U.S. connection to the violation of
the law of nations.
In sum, when Congress authorizes application of
the law of nations, it should be presumed to authorize
application of all of the law of nations, including the
relevant law of jurisdiction. As the next two Parts
explain, the law of nations permits universal jurisdiction in civil suits. In fact, historical authorities from
the Middle Ages through the 19th Century suggest
that it would have been contrary to the law of nations
at the time of the ATS’s enactment to close U.S.
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courts to foreigners, thereby discriminating against
them and denying them access to justice.
II.

The Law of Nations Imposes a Duty to
Provide Foreigners Access to Justice for
Claims Arising Anywhere

In the 20th and 21st Centuries there has been a
superfluity of sensitivity regarding territorial sovereignty. But from the Middle Ages through the 19th
Century, the consideration that dwarfed all others
was the avoidance of war. Armed hostilities were
unrestrained by rules; civilian noncombatants were
not spared if they were near the war zones; the
fighting was savage and cruel. Brigands roamed the
countryside.11 The basic rules of international law
were respected because their observance tended to
reduce friction that might lead to unwanted war.
Territorial sovereignty (the term “sovereignty” was
not used much) could be compromised by incursions
like capitulatory regimes, which today we would find
almost inconceivable.12 Yet there was no rule of customary international law prohibiting recourse to war;
such a rule did not arise until 1928.13 The only rule

See Barbara Tuchman, A DISTANT MIRROR (1978).
One of the last capitulatory regimes, that of the United
States in Morocco, came to an end in the 1950s.
13
Treaty Between the United States and Other Powers
Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of
National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
11
12
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about war was that unjust wars were prohibited.14
But this rule had no practical effect since every party
to a war claimed that justice was on their side. Yet
the concept of justice had a very strong role to play in
avoiding war and establishing national courts.
A. The Law of Nations Historically Required Access to Justice15
For clarity, the discussion that follows uses
generic identifiers:
A, B, C, D
B
J
K

=
=
=
=

independent states
state within which the tort takes place
national of A and plaintiff
national of B

In the Middle Ages when trade between European nations and the Far East became a huge source
of new wealth, and caravans of 10,000 camels were
not uncommon, armed gangs of thieves and brigands
would strike quickly against part of the caravan,
14

JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE SPANISH ORIGIN OF INTERNALAW: FRANCISCO DE VITORIA AND HIS LAW OF NATIONS
(2000).
15
Among the many books and articles consulted for this
historical review, the following are the most salient: ALWYN V.
FREEMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR
DENIAL OF JUSTICE (1938); JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1960); EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE
LAW OF NATIONS (Joseph Chitty ed., Philadelphia, T. & J. W.
Johnson 1853) (1758).
TIONAL
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gather loot, and run away. Suppose an attack took
place in B as J’s caravan passed through to its home
in A. The traders who with J suffered property losses
and in many cases personal injuries, appealed to the
king of A to order an armed expedition against B to
recover the worth of the stolen property. The king,
terrified of starting a war, refused. J and his fellow
merchants resorted to self-help. They hired mercenaries and formed a mini-army that entered B’s territory
and killed the people of the nearest cities and towns.
They collected money and valuables until J decided
that the loot was sufficient to repay his losses and
also pay the salaries of the mercenaries. They returned to A, having completed their reprisal against
B.
Although theoretically sound, reprisals in practice were subject to many abuses: for example, the
mercenaries got greedy and turned to all-out aggression against B; or the mercenaries’ motives were
misinterpreted leading to B’s initiation of a fullfledged war. The practical problems were solved by
one of the most ingenious devices in the history of
international relations: the unilateral issuance of
letters of marque and reprisal. Let us go back to the
king’s refusal to use his armies to invade B. Instead
of remitting J to self-help, the king issues to J a letter
of marque if the reprisal is going to involve vessels in
and around the Mediterranean Sea, or a letter of
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reprisal if the hostilities will be land-based.16 A typical
Letter of Reprisal authorized the trader (J, in our
example) to mount an expedition to invade the host
country (B, in our example) and to engage in forcible
reprisals as described and sworn to by J. The Letter
would recite that the trader had tried to petition the
king of B for restitution, that his property had been
unjustly taken from him by nationals of B within B,
that J was justified by the king of A in mounting a
limited-purpose expeditionary force. The Letter also
provided that the target of the expedition was strictly
confined to named towns and villages; the maximum
monetary value of the property the trader could take
(to cover his losses plus the costs of the expedition)
was specified; an assurance was given that once the
trader achieved his goal, the expeditionary force
would not engage in self-serving acts of violence but
rather would depart; and a time limit was specified
during which the Letter of Reprisal remained valid. If
any of these conditions were violated by J, then the
king of B had the right to send in his armies to fight J
and his mercenaries. Additional clauses, express or
implied in various letters, stated the general understanding that if host country citizens were killed
defending their property, it was an inevitable byproduct of the reprisal and not its purpose. In sum,
the Letter of Reprisal served to require that the
16

The United States Constitution provides that Congress
shall have Power to “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal.”
U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 11.
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reprisal be proportional to the injury the trader
suffered, thus reducing the risk of runaway tit-for-tat
sanctioning.
The conditions specified in a letter of reprisal
could have been violated by J and his mercenaries
when they were in the territory of B, but then, when
they wanted to go home to A, the king of A could be
waiting to arrest them for transgressing the terms of
the reprisal. Thus the terms of the reprisal were
efficiently enforced even without the participation of
the king of B. Although the act of reprisal might have
looked like a war, it was the opposite: it helped maintain the peace. Evidence of this remarkable success of
the reprisal mechanism is found in the references to
reprisals in treaties of peace. Those treaties would be
the last place to find approval of reprisals if the
reprisals were viewed as prolongations of war. For
example, the Treaty of Ryswick provided:
The ordinary course of Justice shall be free
and open on both sides, and the Subjects
both of the one and the other Dominion may
pursue their Rights, Suits and Pretensions,
according to the Laws and Statutes of each
Country; and then without any Distinction
obtain all the Satisfaction that is justly due
to them;17

17

Treaty of Ryswick, Between France and the United
Provinces, Sept. 20, 1697, Art. 12.
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And the Treaty of Utrecht contained this provision:
That the ordinary Distribution of Justice be
restored and open again thro’ the Kingdoms
and Dominions of each of their Royal
Majestys; so that it may be free for all the
Subjects on both sides to prosecute and obtain their Rights, Pretensions and Actions;
according to the Laws, Constitutions, and
Statutes of each Kingdom: and especially, if
there be Complaints concerning any Injurys
or Grievances which have been done contrary
to the Tenor of the Treatys, either in time of
Peace, or at the beginning of the War lately
ended, care shall be taken that the Damages
be forthwith made good, according to the
Rules of Justice.18
The biggest flaw, or hole, in the system of reprisals was not in how they were carried out, but in how
they were procured. A trader might misrepresent to
his home-state king that his caravan was attacked
and suffered significant losses in property. The king
might have no way of checking whether the trader
was telling the truth. This impasse was solved by the
rise of two of the most significant and enduring rules
of international law: (1) the rule that a state’s courts

18

Treaty of Utrecht, Between Great Britain, France,
Ireland, and Spain, July 13, 1713, Art. VII.
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must be open to foreigners on a fair and nondiscriminatory basis, and (2) the rule known as denial of
justice.
1. Primary Function of Courts
The most fundamental reason for a state to
establish courts is to prevent parties to controversies
from resorting to self-help or taking private revenge.19
Over the long term this worked so long as the courts
were perceived as unbiased, uncorrupted, and acting
according to fair rules of procedure. Since there would
always be a number of plaintiffs who were aliens, and
because prior to the 20th Century there were no international courts, a rule of customary international
law developed early to the effect that a nation’s courts
must be open to aliens on a procedurally fair and
uncorrupted basis.20
In cases where both parties were nationals, there
was little that a losing party could do about an unfair
judgment. But if the losing party was a foreigner,
then that person might go back to his home state and
persuade the king to take military action against the
19

Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,
86 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
20
The U.S. Constitution embodies this rule of customary
international law in Article III, Section 2, which provides that
judicial power shall extend to all cases “between a State, or the
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects.” U.S.
Const. art. III, sec. 2.
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host state.21 Customary international law quickly
developed a supplement to the rule requiring national
courts to be open fairly to aliens. This additional rule
established the important requirement that whatever
the procedures of national courts might be, there
should be no procedural discrimination against
aliens.22 Aliens should not be treated below the “national standard.” If nevertheless there was discrimination against aliens, then the rapidly developing
rule of “denial of justice” entered the picture.
2. The Rule of Denial of Justice
Emmerich de Vattel – whom the Framers of the
Constitution relied upon as the authoritative text on
the law of nations – defined “denial of justice” as
follows:
(1) A refusal to hear the complaints of
a [foreign] State or of its subjects or to allow
the subjects to assert their rights before the
ordinary tribunals.

21

This sounds strange today, but in the climate of opinion
in the Middle Ages, states were small and had limited military
power, and foreign plaintiffs might be traders whose business
was vitally important to the economy of host states and home
states.
22
The rule did not work in reverse. Nationals that were
party to lawsuits in their own state could not demand higher
procedural standards that were accorded to aliens. Compare the
(misguided) perception voiced by some commentators today that
the ATS treats aliens better than citizens.
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(2) By pretended delays, for which no
good reason can be given; delays equivalent
to a refusal or even more injurious than one.
(3) By a decision manifestly unjust and
one-sided. But the injustice must be evident
and unmistakable.23
It was with the rapid growth of the practice of
denial of justice that kings found a solution to the
initial corroboration necessary before taking a trader’s word for it that he had been robbed in another
state and wanted a Letter of Reprisal. In the space of
less than a hundred years, kings had made a denial of
justice into a condition precedent to the issuance of
letters of marque and reprisal. The flaw in the system
was repaired. Henceforth, an application by an aggrieved national for a Letter of Reprisal had to be
supported by papers showing a denial of justice. Thus
if trader J is injured and robbed while taking his
caravan through B, he would first have to sue the
government of B before J could mount a reprisal
23

VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, Bk. II, Ch. XVIII, § 350. As
stated by the Harvard Research Draft of 1929: “A State is
responsible if an injury to an alien results from a denial of
justice. Denial of justice exists when there is a denial, unwarranted delay or obstruction of access to courts, gross deficiency
in the administration of judicial or remedial process, failure to
provide those guarantees which are generally considered
indispensable to the proper administration of justice, or a
manifestly unjust judgment. An error of a national court which
does not produce manifest injustice is not a denial of justice.
Article 9, Harvard Research Draft, 23 AM. J. INT’L L. 173 (Spec.
Suppl. 1929).

27
mission against B. If the lawsuit is successful, J’s
claim would be deemed satisfied. If unsuccessful, J
would have to prove that the lawsuit violated one of
the three Vattelian criteria for denial of justice.
Using the judicial decision as a condition precedent gave new powers of authority to the judiciary.
First, there was no need for a court to enforce a
judgment when the judgment itself had the power
either of triggering or of suppressing a potential
reprisal. Second, the judicial procedures became open
to sharp scrutiny; it was no longer easy for judges to
vote their biases against foreign parties. (Even so, the
judges themselves might be biased. A strong impetus
for the ATS was the realization that Europeans did
not want to prosecute U.S. tortfeasors in U.S. state
courts; the ATS provided a federal (and ostensibly
fairer) forum for alien plaintiffs in the United States.)
Third and most important is the fact that two torts,
not just one, are involved in cases of potential denial
of justice. Let us call the first tort the “underlying
tort,” and the second one the “derivative tort.” Suppose J, a trader carrying merchandise, is assaulted
and robbed by K. Although the parties are from different states, international law never took cognizance
of ordinary torts such as these. J would typically sue
K in an ordinary court in whatever country J found
K. But if J did not receive justice in the court he chose
(injustice has to go farther than merely losing the
case), then a second, derivative tort arises. It is the
tort perpetrated by the judicial system of the country
where J is suing. The evidence of this judicial tort is
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defined by the customary law of nations. Since the
criteria of the derivative tort are the same everywhere, J could file suit in any state’s court where he
could find and serve K.
J’s choice of venue is salient in respect of the
question addressed by this Amicus Brief. Suppose,
first, that J brings suit in his home state A. J’s evidentiary showing would be tainted, perhaps unfairly,
by the fact that J is choosing the home court advantage. Suppose, second, that J sues K and B in B.
Since the derivative tort occurred in B (our original
definition), J would suspect B of being unable to
deliver an unbiased result through its court system.
Suppose, third, that J sues B in C for the derivative
tort. The courts of C would have to take the case (rule
of customary international law). J may prefer the
courts of C because of C’s neutral position, and also if
B has assets in C that J could attach.24 (C represents
the United States in the present Question Presented.)
The importance to the international legal system
of having judicial resolutions of all cases and controversies (lest they escalate into wars) is thus proved by
the considerations involved in the triangular set of
case fdenial of justice fletter of reprisal. J, the aggrieved party, had his choice of national courts. All
the courts would be applying the same law, namely,
the international law of derivative torts.
24

B’s public assets in C, such as B’s embassy building, were,
according to Vattel, not attachable.
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III. The Law of Nations Contemplates Universal Jurisdiction in Civil Suits
The duty to provide access to justice endured
through the 19th Century and supports universal
jurisdiction in civil suits between foreigners under
the ATS. As this Court acknowledged in Sosa,25 the
law of nations traditionally included both public and
private international law26 and linked torts and
crimes. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 723 (rejecting Sosa’s
argument that law-of-nations violations were only
“public wrongs” and explaining that “Vattel explicitly
linked” criminal and civil remedies); see also David J.
Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the
Early Common Law, 76 B.U. LAW REV. 59, 59 (1996)
25

542 U.S. at 715 (“The law of nations included a second,
more pedestrian element, however, that did fall within the
judicial sphere, as a body of judge-made law regulating the
conduct of individuals situated outside domestic boundaries and
consequently carrying an international savor.”).
26
See, e.g., Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 589
(1839) (describing private international law and conflict of laws
in particular as part of “the law of nations”); JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4 (Little, Brown and
Co., 5th ed. 1857) (describing “the importance of . . . international principles in matters of mere private right and duty”); id. at
§ 9 (“The jurisprudence, then, arising from the conflict of the
laws of different nations, in their actual application to modern
commerce and intercourse, is a most interesting and important
branch of public law. To no part of the world is it of more interest
and importance than to the United States. . . . This branch of
public law may, therefore, be fitly denominated private international law. . . .”); id. at § 30 (including private international law
as part “of the acknowledged law of nations”).
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(“The distinction between crime and tort was not a
difference between two kinds of wrongful acts. In
most instances, the same wrong could be prosecuted
either as a crime or as a tort. Nor was the distinction
a difference between the kinds of persons who could
initiate the actions. Victims could initiate both
kinds.”) (emphasis added).
Then, as now, transitory torts can be brought in
U.S. courts. In fact, as the previous Part above and
the writings of Joseph Story quoted below explain, it
would have been contrary to the law of nations at the
time of the ATS’s enactment to close U.S. courts to
foreigners, thereby discriminating against them and
denying them access to justice. As to the ATS in
particular, under longstanding principles of public
and private international law, the law of nations
provides conduct-regulating rules defining actionable
universal jurisdiction violations of international law
and forum law, or the lex fori, provides the remedy.
A. The Law of Nations Authorizes Universal Adjudicative Jurisdiction
To begin, as a matter of adjudicative jurisdiction
there is nothing exceptional about U.S. courts entertaining suits between foreigners arising out of foreign
conduct or transactions, and it certainly is not a
violation of international law. Joseph Story could not
have been clearer on this point – the relevant section
from his famous Commentaries on the Conflict of
Laws is reproduced in full immediately below:
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There are nations, indeed, which wholly refuse to take cognizance of controversies between foreigners, and remit them for relief to
their own domestic tribunals, or to that of
the party defendant; and especially, as to
matters originating in foreign countries.
Thus, in France, with few exceptions, the
tribunals do not entertain jurisdiction of controversies between foreigners respecting personal rights and interests. But this is a
matter of mere municipal policy and convenience, and does not result from any principles
of international law. In England and America, on the other hand, suits are maintainable, and are constantly maintained, between
foreigners, where either of them is within the
territory of the State in which the suit is
brought.
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 542 (Little, Brown and Co., 5th ed. 1857)
(emphasis added). This has been so throughout U.S.
history. See Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 885 (collecting
cases). In other words, all that is needed is personal
jurisdiction. See id; see also STORY, COMMENTARIES at
§ 554 (“It has already been stated, that by the common law personal actions, being transitory, may be
brought in any place where the party defendant can
be found.”). In fact, according to Story:
All that any nation can, therefore, be justly
required to do, is to open its own tribunals to
foreigners, in the same manner and to the
same extent, as they are open to its own subjects; and to give them the same redress, as to
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rights and wrongs, which it deems fit to
acknowledge in its own municipal code for
natives and residents.
Id. at § 557 (emphasis added). According to Story,
private international law was a matter of “international justice.” Id. at § 3; see also id. at § 557 (“The
business of the administration of justice by any
nation is, in a peculiar and emphatic sense, a part of
its public right and duty.”). Thus there is nothing
unique about U.S. courts entertaining suits between
foreigners, even “as to matters originating in foreign
countries”: such suits “are maintainable, and are
constantly maintained” in the United States, and
affording redress to foreigners was a matter of international justice. Id. at §§ 542, 547.
B. The Law of Nations Authorizes Universal Prescriptive Jurisdiction to
Apply International Law and Remedies Under the Lex Fori
The question then becomes what prescriptive
jurisdiction or law applies to foreign violations of the
law of nations. As Part I of this Brief explained, when
courts exercise universal jurisdiction they do not
apply national law but the law of nations. That is,
international law itself prescribes the applicable
conduct-regulating rule. And in civil suits between
foreigners for claims arising abroad private international law has long provided that the law of the
forum, or the lex fori, supplies the remedy. Again,
Story could not have been clearer:

33
It is universally admitted and established,
that the forms of remedies, and the modes of
proceeding, and the execution of judgments,
are to be regulated solely and exclusively by
the laws of the place where the action is instituted; or, as the civilians uniformly express it, according to the Lex fori.
Id. at § 556; see also, e.g., Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y. 34, 41 (1961) (“As to conflict of law
rules it is of course settled that the law of the forum
is usually in control as to procedures including remedies.”) (Desmond, J.). To be sure, “the forms of remedies and the order of judicial proceedings are to be
according to the law of the place where the action is
instituted, without any regard to the domicile of the
parties, the origin of the right, or the country of the
act.” STORY, COMMENTARIES at § 558 (emphasis added).
As noted, to treat foreigners differently could have
amounted to a denial of justice, or, according to Story,
a refusal of what a nation was “justly required to do.”
Id. at § 557.
Thus where liability existed on a foreign contract,
Story explained, whether such liability could be
enforced against the defendant through personal
arrest, or only in rem, depended on the law of the
forum, not foreign law. This “better opinion now
established both in England and America” was actually exemplified by, among other cases, what today
some would call a “foreign-cubed” case: namely, “a
recent case in England, where the plaintiff and the
defendant were both foreigners, and the debt was
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contracted in a country, by whose laws the defendant
would not have been liable to an arrest.” STORY,
COMMENTARIES at § 571. In the case, De la Vega v.
Vianna, the plaintiff, a Spaniard, arrested the defendant, a Portuguese, in England for a debt arising
out of a contract entered into in Portugal. (1830), 109
Eng. Rep. 792 (K.B.); 1 B. & Ad. 284. The defendant
challenged his arrest on the basis that Portuguese
law governing the contract, or the lex causae, did not
establish that form of remedy. Id. The House of Lords
flatly rejected this argument. Id. at 793. Lord
Tenterton explained that the foreign party in England
“must take the law as he finds it. . . . He is to have
the same rights which all the subjects of this kingdom
are entitled to.” Id. See also STORY, COMMENTARIES at
§ 571. The same should hold for ATS suits under
these longstanding international legal principles. The
law of nations creates liability for universal jurisdiction violations, and the ATS supplies the form of
remedy. A foreign defendant in U.S. court “must take
the law as he finds it,” and foreign plaintiffs are “to
have the same rights which all the [citizens of the
United States] are entitled to.” De la Vega v. Vianna,
(1830), 109 Eng. Rep. 792-93 (K.B.); 1 B. & Ad. 284;
STORY, COMMENTARIES at § 571.
---------------------------------i---------------------------------

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the ATS expressly invokes the law
of nations, and that law authorizes and sometimes
requires jurisdiction over causes of action arising
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anywhere in the world. It would compromise the
statute’s text as well as ignore longstanding canons of
construction to limit the ATS to claims arising in the
United States.
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